Dorit Ganson

  • Associate Professor of Philosophy

Areas of Study

Education

  • BA, Princeton University, 1989
  • MA, Cornell University, 1994
  • PhD, Cornell University, 1999

Biography

Dorit Ganson has published work in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, and is particularly interested in the role of practical interests in epistemic evaluation, the relation between degree of belief and outright belief, and Bayesian epistemology.

Select publications include “Epistemic and Pragmatic Principles for an Uncertain World,” ProtoSociology, 2011 “Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief,” Philosophical Studies 139: 441- 458, 2008 “Van Fraassen’s Dutch Book Argument against Explanationism,” in Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 4: Explanation and Causation, MIT Press, 2007; and "The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism," Garland Press, 2001.

In addition to teaching, Ganson also serves as the contact person for students seeking information about the process for transfer of credit.

“Epistemic and Pragmatic Principles for an Uncertain World,” ProtoSociology, 2011

“Evidentialism and Pragmatic Constraints on Outright Belief,” Philosophical Studies 139: 441-458, 2008

“Van Fraassen’s Dutch Book Argument against Explanationism,” in Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 4: Explanation and Causation, MIT Press, 2007

“The Explanationist Defense of Scientific Realism,” Garland Press, 2001

Fall 2023

Epistemology — PHIL 206

Spring 2024

Reason and Argument — PHIL 201