

# Is America Fragmenting?

Claude S. Fischer<sup>1</sup> and Greggor Mattson<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720;  
email: fischer1@berkeley.edu

<sup>2</sup>Department of Sociology, Oberlin College, Oberlin, Ohio 44074;  
email: greggor.mattson@oberlin.edu

Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2009. 35:435–55

First published online as a Review in Advance on  
April 6, 2009

The *Annual Review of Sociology* is online at  
soc.annualreviews.org

This article's doi:  
10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-115909

Copyright © 2009 by Annual Reviews.  
All rights reserved

0360-0572/09/0811-0435\$20.00

## Key Words

culture wars, immigration, politics, lifestyles, polarization

## Abstract

The view that America is fragmenting is popular among both pundits and academics and may well be endemic to American culture. We review claims that between 1970 and 2005 American society fragmented along lines of cultural politics, social class, immigration, race, or lifestyle. Taking the twentieth century as historical context, we weigh evidence for both main variants of the fragmentation thesis—that there is an increasing divide between two Americas, or that America is fragmenting into a variety of “little worlds that touch but do not interpenetrate.” We find a well-documented, widening gap in social class, whether measured by education or income. We also find that political elites and activists are demonstrably more polarized in 2005 than they were in 1970; this gap’s effect on the electorate is debatable, however. Caveats aside, there is little evidence for increasing fragmentation of America along lines of race, ethnicity, or immigration status. American cultural tastes increasingly cluster into distinct lifeways, but there is little evidence about what effects, if any, this development has. The loudest claims of fragmentation, those concerning value issues, are based on the most contested evidence, but the widening gap between Americans by income and education—which receives less popular attention—is substantial and serious.

## INTRODUCTION

Expressions of concern that American society is fragmenting have mounted over the past few decades, with the proliferation of catchphrases such as culture wars and red state/blue state and of books such as Arthur Schlesinger's *The Disuniting of America*, Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone*, Barbara Ehrenreich's *This Land Is Their Land: Reports from a Divided Nation*, Earl & Merle Black's *Divided America*, Bill Bishop's *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart*, and Ronald Brownstein's dramatic *The Second Civil War*. The pundits' concerns are reflected in surveys as well: Most respondents in the 2000s told poll-takers that "Americans are greatly divided when it comes to the most important values" (Winseman 2004).

The issue is of general sociological import, too, given the emphasis that classical theory places on structural differentiation as modernity unfolds. Durkheim's anomie describes the declining awareness of individuals' mutual interdependence in the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity. Marx foresaw a deepening divide between social classes that would result in mass misery and social upheaval. Weber despaired that anyone but social scientists could find the subjective understanding to empathize with those of other classes, statuses, or parties.

From a historical perspective, the contemporary worry about a fragmenting America is perplexing. Little in the contemporary scene matches the virulence of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century battles over alcohol, slavery, immigration, black enfranchisement, and compulsory schooling, which left property destroyed and bodies in the streets. Nor does contemporary conflict approach the turmoil of the mass demonstrations and political assassinations of the 1960s. And all these pale, of course, before the carnage of the Civil War, the specter that haunts all claims that America is falling apart.

Today's sense of fragmentation may arise from the peculiarities of the mid-twentieth century. The period conventionally known as

the baby boom or the long 1950s (1946–1964) was unprecedented. It was what family historian Stephanie Coontz (1990) called "a very deviant decade" (p. 183), an era of unusually low rates of immigration, high birth rates for young couples, exceptional economic expansion, extensive suburban domesticity, and notable political consensus. In stark contrast to today, intellectuals of that period bemoaned stifling commonality and conformity in such classics as *The Organization Man*, *The Lonely Crowd*, and *The End of Ideology*. Others appreciated all the agreeability. In the mid-1960s, political scientist Robert E. Lane hailed "The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence." Growing wealth, equality, and stability were permitting Americans to replace divisive, ideological politics with a government of common consent run by experts (Lane 1965). That was perhaps the last year any American could make that claim.

Our purpose is to review what social scientists know about the extent and nature of fragmentation in contemporary American society from 1970 through 2005.<sup>1</sup> We define fragmentation as widening breaches among Americans, whether by demographic traits, ideology (core beliefs), culture (tastes or habits), or social ties. Proponents of the fragmentation thesis generally describe two scenarios. In one, society fractured along a single, major, expanding cleavage. In the other, crisscrossing lines of division—which in the tradition of Simmel and Coser should knit society together—deepened, leaving distinct subcultures increasingly separated from one another in "a mosaic of little worlds that touch but do not interpenetrate" (Park 1915, p. 608).

Defining fragmentation broadly as we do opens up much too long a list of potential topics, from racial differences in life outcomes to regional differences in family values. We focus on the handful of issues that have attracted popular and sociological attention: the so-called culture

---

<sup>1</sup>These dates are approximate given the variety of sources but reflect the time frame that guided our inquiry; we focused primarily on scholarship published after 2004.

wars, political polarization, immigrant assimilation, racial gaps, class inequality, and multiplying social worlds. Claims that social trends at the turn of the millennium represent dramatic or unprecedented change must be tempered against some time frame; we weigh them against both the dramatic changes at the end of the nineteenth century that stimulated so much sociological theory and the “very deviant decade” of the 1950s that remains a cultural yardstick for many popular and scholarly discussions of fragmentation.

Our general conclusions are as follows. The culture wars perspective lacks sufficient historical context, weakening its claims that the 1980s and 1990s brought novel, unprecedented, or even dangerous social fragmentation. American political elites since 1970 engaged in increasingly partisan, cultural disputes, but their contestation seems not to have polarized the general public. The strongest signs of widening cleavages in American society lie largely outside fragmentation theses but squarely within traditional sociological inquiry. Gaps by social class and educational attainment are widening among Americans by almost any measure. Ironically, perhaps, the fragmentation of Americans into like-minded educational groups provides evidence against fragmentation by race or ethnicity. Immigration may yet bring fragmentation along ethnic lines, but as of the early twenty-first century, the assimilation of immigrants was proceeding as it had in earlier historical eras, including for the Hispanics who are today the object of particular concern.<sup>2</sup>

## CULTURE WARS

James D. Hunter’s formulation of the culture wars quickly captured the imaginations of scholars and pundits with the image of an America increasingly divided into two contending camps defined by the social turmoil of the 1960s (Hunter 1991, Hunter & Bowman 1996).

On one side are religiously orthodox Americans who subscribe to literal interpretations of faith, moral absolutism, and traditional views of family life, gender roles, and sexuality. On the other side are less religious or less orthodox moral relativists who favor or tolerate gender equality, premarital sex, cohabitation, and homosexuality.

Proponents of the culture wars thesis argue that the different worldviews rooted in faith and family create schisms on other issues, and, together, these concerns increasingly define American politics. Debates about abortion and, later, about homosexuality are central to the conflict. Luker’s (1985, 2007) interviews with activists in the struggles over sexual issues richly describe the two worldviews. Hunter’s thesis attracted a large critical literature that we now briefly review, a literature that will no doubt continue given the 2007 republication in paperback of his grimly titled *Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America’s Culture Wars* (Hunter 1994).

DiMaggio et al. (1996) conducted a series of studies that sought to test the polarization thesis and stimulated others to follow (see Evans 1997; Demerath & Yang 1997; Jelen 1997; Smith 1997; Wolfe 1998; Miller & Hoffmann 1999; Evans et al. 2001; McConkey 2001; DiMaggio 2003; Evans 2003; Rieder 2003b; Fiorina 2004; Pew Research Center 2003; Baker 2005; Bolzendahl & Brooks 2005; Gelman et al. 2008; Fischer & Hout 2006, chapter 9; see also the edited collections by Williams 1997 and Rieder 2003a). They analyzed items from the General Social Survey that asked respondents for their opinions on social issues and sought to see whether variation in answers had widened over time, which was what one would expect if the American public had become polarized on these topics. The answer was no, with the possible exception of abortion (Evans et al. 2001, Furstenberg 2007, Rohlinger 2006). DiMaggio et al. (1996) also tested whether Americans had become increasingly polarized on these issues by age, gender, race, region, and so forth. Again, the answer seems to be largely no. Indeed, on many controversial topics, Americans

<sup>2</sup>This article draws upon Fischer & Hout (2006), especially chapter 9.

seemed to agree more in 2005 than they did in 1970.

Despite these empirical findings, political contestation around moral issues did escalate in the 1990s and 2000s. Political commentator and one-time presidential candidate Pat Buchanan, for example, famously declared to the 1992 Republican Convention that “there is a religious war going on in our country for the soul of America. It is a cultural war.” The scholarly consensus on the puzzle of political fragmentation is (a) that political elites and activists became polarized on culture war topics such as abortion and prayer in the schools, but the general public did not; and (b) that the political parties, particularly the Republican party, moved their positions to align more closely with the preexisting and largely unchanged popular divisions on such questions (see studies cited in the previous paragraph). That is, the Republican party positioned itself to be the party of life and family values and the Democrats became, perhaps by default, the party of choice and individual expression. As a result of this party realignment, voters’ values, political identifications, and votes increasingly correlated with their party affiliations. For example, Lesthaeghe & Neidert (2006) found that county-level measures of delayed marriage and childbearing—indicators of supposedly more modern lifestyles—correlated highly with votes against George W. Bush in 2004. Nevertheless, alignment with party reflected neither a fundamental shift in voters’ core beliefs nor a polarization of their beliefs (see Miller & Hoffmann 1999 for an example of such an analysis).

Fischer & Hout (2006, chapter 9) suggest yet another interpretation of the findings that Americans had not polarized. They assume that social attitudes diffuse in a standard S-shaped pattern. As novel positions spread from a small avant-garde to the general public and then toward eventual consensus, there is a period of greatest division around a 50:50 split when people are most polarized and when group differences are the greatest, between old and young or northern and southern, for example. As opinions further diffuse, the divisions nar-

row until general agreement is reached. This happened, for example, with opinions about whether young mothers should work for pay between the 1930s and 1990s. Fischer & Hout draw the historical implication that the years after 1970 saw the later stages of opinion change on many issues that had roiled American society in the 1960s when there indeed really was a culture war. This S-curve diffusion model explains why DiMaggio et al. (1996) and others failed to find increasing polarization. New issues arise and divide the public, of course. The new family morality issue of the 2000s seems to be same-sex marriage (Hull 2006). In the 1990s, Americans were opposed to legalizing such unions by about two to one, but by the mid-2000s the split was nearly one to one (Saad 2008). Still, Fischer & Hout’s analysis suggests that roughly the past 40 years were not an era of increasing culture wars, but rather a fairly typical era of new issues awakening as others were put to bed. Indeed, from a longer historical perspective, the period from 1990 to 2005 was remarkable for its quiescence.

## POLITICS

Studies show that the two major political parties separated from each other over the past 40 years. This party polarization meant that each became more internally coherent, that partisans lined up more consistently with their parties on issues, and that those alignments increasingly paralleled the religious-secular divide among the activists of the culture wars we have just discussed. Some data suggest that this form of polarization increased during the Clinton presidency and accelerated especially during the George W. Bush presidency (Miller & Hoffmann 1999, Bolce & de Majo 1999, Hetherington 2001, Layman & Carsey 2002, Stonecash et al. 2003, Fiorina 2004, Brooks & Manza 2004, Brady & Han 2004, McCarty et al. 2006, Carsey & Layman 2006, Fiorina & Abrams 2008, Baldassarri & Gelman 2008, Gelman et al. 2008; see also edited collections by Nivola & Brady 2006, 2008). Representatives and senators during those two presidencies

more often voted in line with their parties and less often crossed the aisle; their political loyalty and their ideological consistency across issues increased. Similar trends appeared among the most politically active citizens.

Researchers have not reached consensus on whether political elites reflected changes in the population or actually caused similar political crystallization in the general public. Evidence suggests that party polarization reflected a reshuffling of party memberships and not a shift of opinions among the grassroots electorate. Fiorina & Abrams (2008) describe how average Americans increasingly sorted themselves by party affiliation. Conservatives, tax resisters, whites hostile to affirmative action, and pro-life voters increasingly identified as Republicans, whereas social liberals and foreign policy doves increasingly voted Democratic. Party affiliation became a more reliable signal of a person's position on the moral debates. Some partisans even shifted their policy positions to conform better to their new party (e.g., Carsey & Layman 2006). Hetherington (2001, p. 628) found that National Election Survey respondents in the late 1990s, especially the more educated ones, were "more likely to think about one party positively and one negatively, less likely to feel neutral toward either party, and better able to list why they like and dislike the parties than they were ten to thirty years" before.

The most sizeable and oft-noted shift toward ideology-party consistency—and thus toward partisan polarization—was the defection of Southern whites to the Republican party as a result of the Democrats' embrace of the Civil Rights movement. This swing was itself a response to the shift a generation before of African Americans from the party of Lincoln to the Democratic party (see, e.g., Gamm 1989). Party reshuffling extended beyond racial issues. Hout, Brooks, and Manza have documented shifts among the affluent: Professionals moved into the Democratic party and managers more into the Republican fold (Hout et al. 1995; Brooks & Manza, 1997a,b; Manza & Brooks 1997). As a consequence of these moves, Republican or Democratic affiliation conveyed clearer

signals about ideology and policy and more sharply demarcated voters in 2005 than in 1970. Even if this did not reflect actual opinion change among the population, the reshuffling empowered political elites to pursue more sharply partisan politics.

The level of political partisanship circa 2000 was, however, not new; such divisiveness was common early in the twentieth century. Again, the middle of the twentieth century—up to the turbulent divisions around race and Vietnam in the late 1960s—appears to have been unusual in its relatively low level of political polarization (e.g., Han & Brady 2007, Glaeser & Ward 2008). So unpolarized were politics that in 1950 a commission of the American Political Science Association called for more ideologically differentiated political parties (cited by Bishop 2008, p. 83). The emotion of turn-of-the-millennium divisions had more in common with century-old conflicts around labor, alcohol, women's suffrage, and race than the unusually calm years in the mid-twentieth century.

Political scientists have speculated about the consequences of increasing party polarization since 1970, but there is as yet little consensus. Questions such as whether it would create gridlock in government, disillusionment among voters, or greater turnouts remain, at this writing, unresolved (see, e.g., discussions in Nivola & Brady 2006). One can read recent political campaigns as capitalizing on the perception that the public has tired of polarized politics, such as George W. Bush's claim to be a "uniter, not a divider" and Barack Obama's 2004 speech to Democratic Convention that "we worship an 'awesome God' in the blue states, and we don't like federal agents poking around our libraries in the red states."

## IMMIGRATION AND CULTURAL DIVISION

A quite different front in the fragmentation debate concerns immigration and its potential to divide America culturally. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 opened U.S. borders to immigration after a hiatus of over

40 years, another way in which the mid-twentieth century was demographically unique. By 2000, immigrants accounted for 20% of schoolchildren and 11% of the population, levels not seen for a century (Suarez-Orozco & Suarez-Orozco 2007).

The 2000 Census's count of the foreign-born showed them to be disproportionately Hispanic (46%) (U.S. Census Bur. 2000), and social movements have arisen in response to the perceived cultural threat, such as the English-only campaign, the border-policing Minutemen, and "quality of life" pressure groups opposed to Hispanic day laborers. This threat was articulated most forcefully by Huntington (2004, p. 30): "The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages. Unlike past immigrant groups, Mexicans and other Latinos have not assimilated into mainstream U.S. culture. . . . The United States ignores this challenge at its peril" (see also Huntington 2005, Borjas 1999, Jencks 2001, Graham 2004).

The growth of other immigrant groups, notably East Asians, seems less problematic because they are still smaller in number, less diffused beyond gateway cities, and generally of higher education and affluence (e.g., Alba et al. 1999, Perlmann & Waldinger 1997, Zhou & Xiong 2005). Asian Americans are increasingly bypassing ethnic enclaves in urban cores for middle-class suburbs, an indication of their relative wealth and skills compared with poorer immigrants (Frey 2001, Logan et al. 2002, Fong et al. 2007, Timberlake & Iceland 2007). Ethnicity remains salient, however, as many first- or second-generation immigrants retain ties to Chinatowns or Koreatowns long after they or their parents have moved to the suburbs. Despite those connections and despite short-term decreases in Asian-white intermarriage in regions with booming Asian in-migration (Qian & Lichter 2007), American-born Asians continue to intermarry at disproportionately high rates, both with whites and with

American-born Asians of different ethnicities (Lee & Fernandez 1998, Sohoni 2006).

Contemporary and historical research indicates, however, that Hispanic assimilation is proceeding at a pace comparable to that of immigrants of a century ago (e.g., Parrado & Morgan 2008). This is so despite the volume of Hispanic immigration, its largely single-country origin (Mexico), its concentration in border states, and other factors unique to Mexican migration. Thus far, available indices suggest that Hispanic immigrants are clearly of America, not merely in it.

Economically, Mexican immigrants appear to have been integrating into the occupational structure at a pace comparable to major groups of the past (e.g., Toussaint-Comeau 2006, Waldinger et al. 2007). A major—and controversial—index of assimilation is language. Despite claims that contemporary immigrants are more reluctant than were earlier immigrants to learn English, these immigrants—including Hispanics—have learned English at a faster pace than did immigrants a century earlier (Fischer & Hout 2006, pp. 42–43; Siegel et al. 2000, p. 1). Few Hispanics live in households without an English speaker (Papademetriou 2004, p. 5), and Hispanics basically lose Spanish proficiency within a couple of generations, even in locations where their numbers are dense and segregated, as in Southern California (Rumbaut et al. 2006).

Residential integration is another index of assimilation. The historical presence of Hispanics in the United States for several generations and the post-1980 surge in immigration have given rise to fears that Hispanics could easily isolate themselves in Spanish-speaking enclaves. Despite their distinctive immigration trajectory, however, Hispanics' segregation from non-Hispanics remained relatively constant between 1970 and 2000 (Fischer et al. 2004). At the same time, Mexican immigrants have been moving beyond their earlier ports of entry to other states, many of which had not seen any immigration for a century, such as Iowa (Gozdziaik & Martin 2005,

Jones 2008, Singer et al. 2008). Measures of Asian or Latino concentration, we should note, may overestimate homogeneity by ignoring the significant ethnic diversity within these categories, even in Los Angeles County where Mexicans predominate (Modarres 2004). Yet trends suggest that as social class rises—for immigrants, their children, or native-born blacks—they increasingly assimilate to suburbia (Brown 2007, Iceland & Wilkes 2006, Phelan & Schneider 1996, Wahl et al. 2006).

Intermarriage is perhaps the ultimate indicator of assimilation. The long-term trends have been twofold for all immigrant groups, Hispanic included. First, rates of intermarriage increase over generations. Second, rapid flows of new immigrants into specific marriage markets temporarily slow down out-marrying (Fischer & Hout 2006, pp. 44–45, Rosenfeld 2002, Qian & Lichter 2007, Kalmijn 1998). Such findings suggest that nationwide rates of intermarriage may be unreliable measures of social distance because the pockets of racial diversity that compose marriage markets are unevenly distributed across the country (Harris & Ono 2005). Researchers find close parallels between the experiences of Italian Americans in the late nineteenth century and Mexican Americans in the late twentieth (Perlmann 2007, Wildsmith, Gutmann & Gratton 2003). Combined with the other indicators, the general trend toward immigration assimilation, including of Mexicans, is following a well-known trajectory at a pace no slower than that followed by earlier, mostly European groups, with some indications that Hispanic incorporation is proceeding faster than for previous immigrants.

The dominant counter-thesis to the consensus view of orderly immigrant incorporation is the segmented assimilation thesis. Its proponents argue that the children of less-educated immigrants assimilate not to the mainstream middle class, but into the neighborhoods and lifeways of the largely black American underclass (see Rumbaut 1994, Alba & Nee 2003, and Portes 2007 for formulations; cf. Bean & Stevens 2003, South et al. 2005, Borges & Medina-Mora 2006). A contrasting interpreta-

tion of segmented assimilation data contends that Hispanics, excluding the darker-skinned among them, are being whitened alongside Asians and will eventually be on the advantaged side of a society that becomes increasingly divided between blacks and nonblacks (see, e.g., Bean et al. 2004, Bean & Stevens 2003, Lee & Bean 2004, Qian & Lichter 2007). Both interpretations, nonetheless, imply that Hispanics are blending with the existing American structure, in one way or another, rather than creating an enduring, parallel fragment.

Three major caveats must be noted before rejecting the Hispanic fragmentation argument wholesale. One is the hidden number of undocumented immigrants, estimated at approximately 11 million in 2006, whose experiences are unlikely to be fully reflected in existing research.<sup>3</sup> Studies suggest that undocumented migrants are alienated from each other and from their legal coethnics, undermining the solidarity that helps assimilate immigrants socially and economically (Mahler 1995). A second qualification is that the process of assimilation is a balance between the rate at which immigrants meld into the wider society and the rate at which the new immigrant pool is replenished by continuing immigration (Jiménez 2008). About a century ago, the assimilation of European groups may have been accelerated by the shutoff in immigration in the 1920s that ended their replenishment (Lieberson 1980). In the contemporary Mexican case, the acceleration of immigration in the 1990s appears to have slowed down assimilation. Residential integration stalled or reversed (e.g., Logan et al. 2004), and intermarriage rates declined between 1990 and 2000 (Lichter et al. 2007). Similar trends were observed among Asian groups in areas that experienced a dramatic rise in coethnics. The third and perhaps greatest qualification concerns immigration after 2000. If the pace of Hispanic assimilation indeed slowed after 2000

<sup>3</sup>The Pew Hispanic Center Report (Passel 2006) estimated 11–11.5 million the Department of Homeland Security, 10.5 million (Hoefler et al. 2006).

owing to the post-9/11 political changes that further marginalized immigrants and to the recession of 2008–2009, future Hispanic assimilation may start to deviate from the historical pattern of European groups.

Even if such a new pattern does not emerge, it remains the case that between 1970 and 2005 a distinctive Hispanic sector of American society expanded and solidified. In 2006, 12 of the 360 metropolitan statistical areas were majority Hispanic, and 35 were over 30% Hispanic; in 14 of the 235 largest cities most residents spoke Spanish at home, and in 46 cities at least 30% did (U.S. Census Bur. 2008b, tables 22, 54). In this sense, the 2000s marked an increasing—even if perhaps temporary—ethno-cultural fragmentation between Hispanic and non-Hispanic Americans just as there was even more such fragmentation in the early twentieth century when American cities hosted foreign-language Germantowns, Little Italys, and Greektowns (although one could argue that the European enclaves circa 1900 were more heterogeneous than the Hispanic enclaves circa 2000, and they were certainly more mixed than black ghettos).

## RACE

Contemporary evidence paints a less dire account of racial relations than those generated during the Civil Rights movement. In 1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the Kerner Commission), appointed by President Johnson to explain the ghetto violence of the 1960s, wrote: “This is our basic conclusion: Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal” (this report is available on many sites, including <http://www.eisenhowerfoundation.org/docs/kerner.pdf>). The nuances of this foreboding are complex, a full exploration of which could take us into a vast literature on racial differences. A capsule review of the evidence suggests that blacks and whites were less separated in the 2000s than in the 1960s, a position advanced nearly three decades ago by William Julius Wilson (1980).

To be sure, black-white differences remain the largest ethnic-racial gaps in American society, racial discrimination certainly persists, and race often is the single most determining factor in life outcomes such as where people live, their health and happiness, and their encounters with the justice system (e.g., Krysan & Bader 2007). Even with these substantial obstacles to full equality, the divide between blacks and whites narrowed. Residential segregation became less acute after 1970 (Logan et al. 2004, Fischer et al. 2004), economic differences shrank (Fischer & Hout 2006), and even intermarriage rates with whites, low as they are, rose noticeably (Gullickson 2006a, Qian & Lichter 2007). These trends, however seem to have left most African Americans at the lowest socioeconomic rungs. For example, black-white intermarriage largely occurred among blacks with at least some college, a relatively small group to begin with (Gullickson 2006b, Qian & Lichter 2007). This trend of decreasing racial divisions among the middle class brings us to question of fragmentation by social class.

## CLASS

One of the post-1970 trends most heavily documented by scholars is America’s widening economic inequality. From 1970 to 2005, the gap between the highest income households, at the 90th percentile, and the lowest income households, at the 10th percentile, grew from a ratio of 9:1 to a ratio of 11:1, mainly because the wealthier moved farther ahead of the average (the ratio of the 95th to the 50th grew from 2.7:1 to 3.6:1). The trends were consistent among whites, blacks, and Hispanics (U.S. Census Bur. 2008a, tables A-3 and H-4; see also table IE-2 for earnings data). Wealth inequality is much greater and also has been growing—or at least had been until the market collapse of 2008–2009; consumption inequality is much less but also seems to have grown at least slightly (Wolff 2000; Fischer & Hout 2006, chapter 6). Over the same period, the affluent increasingly lived in communities apart from



other Americans (Fischer et al. 2004, Vesselinov et al. 2007).

An even greater separation developed between those of higher and lower educational levels. Americans of differing educational levels diverged not only in earnings and income, but also in their rates of employment and job satisfaction (Fischer & Hout 2006, chapter 6). College graduates increasingly concentrated in economically vibrant metropolitan downtowns, whereas those with fewer credentials stayed in or moved to declining metropolitan areas and neighborhoods, often in the suburbs (Murphy 2007, Domina 2006, Birch 2006, Lloyd 2006, Florida 2003). Educational attainment also increasingly stratified family life. More Americans married people of the same educational level (Schwartz & Mare 2005), with educational homogamy accounting for most interethnic unions (Qian & Lichter 2007). A wide gap opened between the more and less educated in their chances of being married, getting divorced, and having children living with two adults (Martin 2006; Ellwood & Jencks 2001; Fischer & Hout 2006, chapter 4).

Education may increasingly divide Americans for one or both of two reasons. Economists often see education as an index of lifetime earnings and thus as a better measure of an individual's financial position than any one year's income. (Annual incomes fluctuate, understate future earnings for career starters, and underrepresent wealth for retirees.) Thus, fragmentation along educational lines may simply be part of growing economic inequality. But education may also matter because it indexes cultural differences in tastes and lifestyles—whether as cause, consequence, or simply correlate. Such differences become especially visible when people cluster geographically in, say, gentrifying downtowns, family-centered suburbs, or traditionalist exurbs. They also affect the inheritance of social position because education itself influences childrearing practices (e.g., Lareau 2003). These overlapping trends strongly suggest a growing split in America by levels of educational attainment (Fischer & Hout 2006).

The fragmentation of American into haves and have-nots plays almost no role in contemporary discussions of culture wars, in stark contrast to the dawn of the twentieth century when Jacob Riis published *How the Other Half Lives* (1890). Popular discussions of fragmentation by social class, a staple of the sociological enterprise, are much less common. Yet, as Greeley & Hout (2006) show, even among Christian Conservatives, income levels increasingly affected voting choices.<sup>4</sup> Were one to make an argument that class inequality was fragmenting America, it would likely occur through widening differences in lifeways and social practices, the topic to which we now turn.

## WAYS OF LIFE

The visions of fragmentation we have reviewed so far imagine a splitting of American society into two estranged parts. The second general way observers discuss fragmentation is in terms not of a central cleavage, but of multiplying, cross-cutting divisions that yield many distinct cultural subgroups. The strongest framing of lifestyle fragmentation is the claim that the great majority of Americans once shared a common set of worldviews and ways of life and that this unity splintered since 1970 so that by 2000 Americans divided into numerous, increasingly distinct and estranged social worlds.<sup>5</sup> A weaker framing might be that Americans do have more choices in their lifeways and do display increasing variation in cultural styles (especially compared with mid-century), but that they still share a common, underlying cultural “toolkit” (Swidler 1986).

Sociological research on homophily and on social distancing provides a related perspective on fragmentation by considering how

<sup>4</sup>“The impact of family income on voting increased more than the differences among religions did from the 1970s to 2000” (Greeley & Hout 2006, p. 66).

<sup>5</sup>Bellah et al. (1985, 71ff) discuss “lifestyle enclaves,” which they critique as unworthy of the term communities, a similar idea since used by subsequent scholars (see also Gans 1962, Rieder 2003b, Bishop 2008, Florida 2008).

preference for similarity promotes connections among some people and estrangement from others. It raises the possibility that lifestyle clustering passively generates inequalities because these networks exclude outsiders by criteria that reinforce underlying stratification (Montgomery 2006, McPherson et al. 2001). Thus, preference for employees like oneself may explain racial and gender disparities in hiring, promotion, and job turnover more than do cliquishness, racism, or sexism (Beckman & Phillips 2005; Dobrev 2005; Kmec 2007; Roth 2004a,b; Ruef et al. 2003). Such mechanisms seem to underlie, for example, the interracial friendships of children (Doyle & Kao 2007, Joyner & Kao 2000). Similarly, people may prefer certain cultural forms not as a way to outsnob their social inferiors, but as a reflection of their desire to interact with their peers (Mark 2003). To the extent that some people—notably the affluent and educated—have expanded resources to find one another, we would expect to see lifestyle fragmentation.

In a second approach to lifestyle fragmentation, sociologists of culture use patterns of consumption to identify distinct lifestyles. These researchers assume that people in affluent nations define themselves less by class, ethnicity, race, or place, but more by their leisure and consumer tastes in, for example, music, clothes, and food (see Castells 1997; Giddens 1991; Featherstone 1991; Florida 2002; Katz-Gerro 2002, 2004; Tomlinson 2003; review by Zukin & Maguire 2004; for political applications, see Waldman & Green 2006, Franke-Ruta 2006, Bishop 2008). Researchers use surveys in which respondents are asked questions ranging from their opera attendance and potato chip consumption to matters of faith. Clustering programs identify sets of respondents who respond in similar ways and thus seem to display similar lifestyle patterns. Some analysts describe “cultural tribes” such as “down-shifters, environmentalists, nonsmokers, residents in gated communities, clubbers, and hackers,” groups that are not only statistically distinguishable, but presumably

are inward-looking, internally connected, and relatively disconnected from one another (Katz-Gerro 2004, p. 11). Researchers subsequently ask whether sharing certain lifestyles emerges from certain backgrounds, such as particular occupations, demographic categories, or communities.

Evidence in this vein suggests a divergence in consumption by education level between less-educated, lowbrow, niche consumers who prefer the familiar foods of family restaurants and diners versus well-educated, highbrow, “cultural omnivores” who seek a variety of exotic, supposedly authentic cuisines (Alderson et al. 2007, García-Álvarez et al. 2007, Johnston & Baumann 2007, Lizardo 2006a, López-Sintas & Katz-Gerro 2005). Such upper-class omnivorousness was displayed when *Blender* magazine revealed that both of the 2008 presidential candidates listed Frank Sinatra tracks among their ten favorite songs, with McCain also preferring tunes by Louis Armstrong, the Beach Boys, ABBA, and Merle Haggard and Obama adding the Rolling Stones, U2, Nina Simone, and Kanye West (Coplon 2008). While the spread of cultural omnivorousness is a well-documented trend, its distinctiveness among the middle class and its relevance to other behavior is a matter of some dispute (Lizardo 2006b, Peterson 2005, Tampubolon 2008, van Eijck & Lievens 2008, Warde et al. 2007).

Systematic research on whether lifestyle fragmentation has increased seems absent, whether geographically or culturally based. Fischer & Hout (2006, chapter 9) (with Jane Zavisca) applied latent class analysis to General Social Survey data on respondents’ social traits and social attitudes to ask whether the number of statistically distinguishable clusters grew between the 1970s and 1990s. They identified nine clusters of respondents in the 1970s and ten each in the 1980s and 1990s. They also found that Americans were somewhat more dispersed across clusters in the later decades. These trends marginally support a fragmentation thesis, but they are hardly of the scale suggested by pundits and theorists.

A third version of the lifestyle-fragmentation thesis might be called “consumption geography.” Several companies have developed place-based typologies as marketing tools. They combine vast amounts of demographic information about geographic units such as zip codes or census block clusters with proprietary commercial data to generate typologies of American households (e.g., Weiss 2000, Tharpe 2001, Goss 1995, Michman et al. 2003). One company, Claritas, divided Americans into 67 types in 2005. The 2.5% of American households that populated the company’s “Mayberry-ville” type contained white, small-town high school graduates, with above-average income, no children at home, living in small towns—“middle-class couples and families [who] like to fish and hunt during the day, and stay home and watch TV at night.” The 1.1% who were “New Empty Nests” were a bit older and richer, lived in the suburbs, had graduated college, “pursue active—and activist—lifestyles,” prefer rosé wine, and like to vacation in Italy. And in roughly the same age group, the “Sunset City Blues,” 1.7% of all Americans, had high school diplomas, modest incomes, lived in cities, and “maintain a low-key lifestyle filled with newspapers and television by day, and family-style restaurants at night.”<sup>6</sup>

Consumption geography researchers make one assumption that is critical to the whole endeavor: that people are so sharply segregated by tastes that “you are where you live,” as the Claritas Web site declares. [Richard Florida (2008, 2002) advances a similar argument for the educated elite, or “creative class.”] Consumption geographers assert that fragmentation has grown in America: “Forget the melting pot. America today would be better characterized as a salad bar. . . . America has fractured into distinctive lifestyles, each with its own borders” (Weiss 2000, p. 10; see also Michman et al. 2003, Garreau 1989). The 67 types of Americans counted by Claritas in 2005 represented a

further fragmentation from the 62 the company reported in 2000 and the mere 40 it estimated for the 1970s and 1980s. Whether the increasing number of clusters is the result of real social change, of access to more kinds of data, or of more aggressive, “discriminatory” marketing is unclear (Turow 2008). Nevertheless, the clustering of consumers into distinct groups suggests growing fragmentation in consumption.

Descriptions of lifestyle enclaves commonly point to the role of media in forming and defining the clusters. Many observers (e.g., Iyengar & Morin 2006) suggest that mass media outlets such as broadcast television and general magazines have given way to specialized media such as cable networks and Internet podcasts and that this shift reflected, caused, or at least facilitated social fragmentation. Many niche-format services have emerged, including ones that are politically specialized (Tewksbury 2005). Political partisans consume news that caters to their particular points of view in what researchers call “selective media exposure” (Stroud 2008), and elites on all sides agree that the mainstream media are biased against them (Schmitt et al. 2004). It is unclear whether media partisanship increases public partisanship or merely reflects existing, enduring divisions (for a sample of studies, see Melican & Dixon 2008, Morris 2007, Anastasio et al. 2005). Similarly, research remains mixed on how new niche media have affected civic involvement, but some of it suggests it stimulates activity (see, e.g., Coleman et al. 2008; Shah et al. 2005; Vaccari 2008; Beaudoin 2007; Cho 2005, 2008).

Although the emergent technologies of this era allowed Americans to select narrow media to consume and to participate in, research finds that they also led Americans to new interactions and contacts. Similarly, social networking sites such as MySpace and Facebook may permit the narcissism decried by critics, but such practices are not inherent to the sites, nor are they universal (Livingstone 2008). For example, lonely adolescents who use the Internet to experiment with personal identity “benefitted significantly” from contact with people from different age groups and cultural backgrounds (Valkenburg

<sup>6</sup>Examples drawn from <http://www.claritas.com/MyBestSegments/Default.jsp>, accessed July 25, 2008.

& Peter 2008). Other research suggests that the Internet and new mobile communication technologies supplement and expand family and community ties (Goodsell & Williamson 2008, Kennedy et al. 2008, Stern & Dillman 2006, Hampton & Wellman 2003).

Access to the new, narrow-cast media is, of course, socially conditioned. Public concern over the digital divide indicates a worry that some groups are cut off from using the Internet to integrate themselves in the wider society (e.g., Ono & Zavodny 2008). Data show that computer ownership and use are diffusing from the advantaged to the disadvantaged sectors of American society in a pattern similar to that of other consumer technologies (U.S. Census Bur. 2005), although cultural uses of technology that differ by social class may leave some Americans offline in ways that matter economically and politically (see, e.g., DiMaggio et al. 2004, Rodino-Colocino 2006, Hargittai & Hinnant 2008, Powell & Snellman 2004). Others suggest, however, that the information and networking opportunities of computers “are calming the culture wars” (Hanson 2007).

It is reasonable to conclude, based on the research by cultural sociologists, scholars of consumption, media analysts, and journalistic accounts, that the number of new, discrete, and separated social worlds increased between 1970 and 2005. Yet we can be misled by novelty if we forget to subtract the number of subcultures that have disappeared. For example, the near-extinction of farming as a way of life has meant the withering of rural ethnic clusters (see, e.g., Labao & Meyer 2001, Luloff & Krannich 2002, Gjerde 1997, Clough & Quimby 1983). Their community organizations, such as the Grange or Future Farmers of America, certainly declined.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, whereas the post-1965 immigration waves generated new urban ethnic neighborhoods, many from a century ago have faded away (e.g., Alba et al. 1997, Morawska

1994, Hirschman 1983). It is plausible, as in our previous assessments of fragmentation arguments, that lifestyle fragmentation at the end of the twentieth century was indeed greater than during the middle of the century, but it may not be unprecedented, as many argue. More systematic research on lifestyles and consumption must be conducted that takes into account the likelihood that the mid-twentieth century represented at least one “very deviant decade” in these spheres as it did demographically and economically.

## IMPLICATIONS

What might be the consequences if the United States was in fact fragmenting, whether by a single, widening division, such as by moral stance or immigrant status, or into shards of small social worlds? Champions of both multiculturalism and free markets might applaud the variety of choices that individuals have and their opportunities for richly varied experiences. Such opportunities, however, presume some interaction across the boundaries, and, almost by definition, the solidification of distinct lines involves stronger barriers. We saw, for example, the decline in Hispanic-non-Hispanic marriages as Mexican immigration swelled in the 1990s, and we saw the rise in community segregation between affluent and other Americans. Whether the withdrawal into more bounded social worlds would increase or decrease social conflict remains to be seen, however.

A relatively recent line of research finds that ethnic and class diversity within political units—nations, states, or cities—depresses solidarity, civic participation, and the provision of public goods (e.g., Costa & Kahn 2003; Alesina & Glaeser 2004; Putnam 2001, 2007). Some follow-up research suggests that these consequences depend on context. For example, whites who regularly talk to their neighbors do not suffer from a loss in trust after their neighborhood becomes more ethnically diverse (Stolle et al. 2008). Kesler & Bloemraad (2008) find that the fragmenting influence of immigrants is actually reversed in societies with

<sup>7</sup>The percentage of respondents who told the General Social Survey that they belonged to a farm organization dropped from over 5% among those born before 1920 to under 3% for those born after 1960 (authors' analysis).

low rates of inequality; in egalitarian societies, immigrants spur political participation and civic engagement among all citizens.

Finally, in a Simmelian sense, some level of group differences and tensions may be useful for productive social change—a view latent in the mid-twentieth-century intellectuals' critiques of the postwar American consensus. Sociologists of institutions argue that otherwise-functioning systems fall apart from lack of productive conflict, either through "groupthink" (Baron & Zanna 2005) or institutional values that suppress disagreement (Jackall 1989, Kunda 2006, Vaughan 1997). Researchers note how the routine avoidance of conflict disempowers citizens from participation in issues that impinge on their lives and produces civic apathy (Eliasoph 1998). Similarly, scholars of social movements document how conflict can lead to political change (e.g., King et al. 2007). Even the internal conflict that plagues social movements seems to be crucial to their success by creating and honing the ideologies and identities that prosper in society at large (Ghaziani 2008).

## CONCLUSION

We have quickly canvassed some of the research social scientists have produced on the thesis that America is increasingly fragmenting. In that effort, we defined fragmentation broadly and examined its contemporary variations. The proposed agents of fragmentation are as interesting for what they do not but could have included. Family, for example, might easily have been featured in this article had it been written in the 1970s when feminism was blamed for a rising divorce rate and disrupting traditional family forms. Yet relations between men and women play little part in contemporary debates, perhaps because marital relations are more egalitarian than ever, especially in terms of education (Amato et al. 2007, Schwartz & Mare 2005). Nor do contemporary concerns over fragmentation seem to implicate globalization. America stands in stark contrast to France and smaller or developing nations where globalization,

especially in the form of American cultural products, represents an attack on local, supposedly authentic traditions. Students of such societies may well discern a fragmentation between domestic globalizers and nationalists. It is an interesting comparative question, rarely explored, whether Americans are more concerned with cultural fragmentation than are citizens of other countries who might be expected to worry about cultural dissolution, such as Russia after the Soviet Union, Great Britain after Welsh and Scottish devolution, or ethnically riven states such as India (Demerath & Straight 1997).

Sexual identity is yet another potential form of division. Stein (2001) profiles a conservative rural town that fractured over a statewide antigay ballot measure despite the absence of a significant homosexual community. We wonder whether the emergence of gay marriage defines a new division or is merely new ground onto which an older struggle has moved. At the same time, the topic may provide evangelicals with an issue that can help define their values and their separation from the wider culture, further illustrating the productive power of conflict (Smith 1998).

One last conclusion about Americans' worries over fragmentation must be that, to paraphrase Clifford Geertz, they are tales we like to tell each other about ourselves. Certainly fragmentation has been an abiding concern in American history, from as early as the Plymouth Plantation divisions that led to the settlement of Connecticut and Rhode Island. Ministers in Colonial New England established the "declension" trope by the eighteenth century—the tight-knit "community of saints" is dissolving into selfish, warring factions—and it remains part of our culture (discussions appear in sources such as Lockridge 1985, Gross 1976, and Greene 1988). Robert Bellah could therefore justifiably note that it is "obvious" that "it has become part of the common culture to ask whether there is a common culture in America" (1998, p. 613). The religious sectarianism embedded in American nationalism may provide both a model for fragmentation and the source of our pervading concern about it.

## DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any biases that might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

## LITERATURE CITED

- Alba RD, Logan JR, Crowder K. 1997. White ethnic neighborhoods and the assimilation process: the greater New York region, 1980–1990. *Soc. Forces* 75:883–909
- Alba RD, Logan JR, Stults BJ, Marzan G, Zhang W. 1999. Immigrant groups in the suburbs: a reexamination of suburbanization and spatial assimilation. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 64:446–60
- Alba RD, Nee V. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
- Alderson AS, Junisbai A, Heacock I. 2007. Social status and cultural consumption in the United States. *Poetics* 35:191–212
- Alesina A, Glaeser EL. 2004. *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press
- Amato PR, Booth A, Johnson DR, Rogers SJ. 2007. *Alone Together: How Marriage in America Is Changing*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press
- Anastasio PA, Rose KC, Chapman JG. 2005. The divisive coverage effect: how media may cleave differences of opinion between social groups. *Commun. Res.* 32:171–92
- Baker W. 2005. *America's Crisis of Values: Reality and Perception*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
- Baldassarri D, Gelman A. 2008. Partisans without constraint: political polarization and trends in American public opinion. *Am. J. Sociol.* 114:408–46
- Baron RS, Zanna MP. 2005. So right it's wrong: groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision making. *Adv. Exp. Soc. Psychol.* 37:219–55
- Bean FD, Lee J, Batalova J, Leach M. 2004. Immigration and fading color lines in America. In *The American People: Census 2000*, ed. R Farley, J Haga, pp. 302–31. New York: Russell Sage Found.
- Bean FD, Stevens G. 2003. *America's Newcomers and the Dynamics of Diversity*. New York: Russell Sage Found.
- Beaudoin CE. 2007. Mass media use, neighborliness, and social support: assessing causal links with panel data. *Commun. Res.* 34:637–64
- Beckman CM, Phillips DJ. 2005. Interorganizational determinants of promotion: client leadership and the attainment of women attorneys. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 70:678–701
- Bellah RN. 1998. Is there a common American culture? *J. Am. Acad. Relig.* 66:613–625
- Bellah RN, Madsen R, Sullivan WM, Swidler A, Tipton SM. 1985. *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. Berkeley: Univ Calif. Press
- Birch EL. 2006. Who lives downtown? In *Redefining Urban and Suburban America: Evidence from Census 2000*, Vol. III, ed. A Berube, B Katz, RE Lang, pp. 29–60. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst.
- Bishop B. 2008. *The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart*. New York: Houghton Mifflin
- Bolce L, de Majo G. 1999. The anti-Christian fundamentalist factor in contemporary politics. *Public Opin. Q.* 63:508–42
- Bolzendahl C, Brooks C. 2005. Polarization, secularization, or differences as usual? The denominational cleavage in U.S. social attitudes since the 1970s. *Sociol. Q.* 46:47–78
- Borges G, Medina-Mora ME. 2006. Alcohol use disorders in national samples of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans: the Mexican national addiction survey and the U.S. national alcohol survey. *Hispanic J. Behav. Sci.* 28:425–49
- Borjas GJ. 1999. *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
- Brady DW, Han H. 2004. *An extended historical view of congressional party polarization*. Presented at Conf. Polarization of American Politics: Myth or Reality? Princeton Univ. Princeton, NJ, Dec. 2 <http://www.princeton.edu/~csdp/events/pdfs/colloquia/BradyHan12022004.pdf>
- Brooks C, Manza J. 1997a. Class politics and political change in the United States, 1952–1992. *Soc. Forces* 76:379–408

- Brooks C, Manza J. 1997b. The social and ideological bases of middle-class political realignment in the United States, 1972–1992. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 62:191–208
- Brooks C, Manza J. 2004. A great divide: religion and political change in U.S. national elections, 1972–2000. *Sociol. Q.* 45:421–50
- Brown SK. 2007. Delayed spatial assimilation: multigenerational incorporation of the Mexican-origin population in Los Angeles. *City Community* 6:193–209
- Buchanan PJ. 1992. *Republican National Convention Speech*. <http://www.buchanan.org/pa-92-0817-rnc.html>
- Carsey TM, Layman GC. 2006. Changing sides or changing minds? Party identification and policy preferences in the American electorate. *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* 50:464–77
- Castells M. 1997. *The Power of Identity: The Information Age*. New York: Blackwell
- Cho J. 2005. Media, interpersonal discussion, and electoral choice. *Commun. Res.* 32:295–322
- Cho J. 2008. Political ads and citizen communication. *Commun. Res.* 35:423–51
- Clough SB, Quimby L. 1983. Peacham, Vermont. *Vermont Hist.* 51:5–28
- Coleman R, Lieber P, Mendelson AL, Kurplus DD. 2008. Public life and the Internet: If you build a better website, will citizens become engaged? *New Media Soc.* 10:179–201
- Coontz S. 1990. *The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap*. New York: Basic Books
- Coplon J. 2008. White House DJ battle. *Blender*, July 30. <http://www.blender.com/WhiteHouseDJBattle/articles/39518.aspx>
- Costa DL, Kahn ME. 2003. Civic engagement and community heterogeneity: an economist's perspective. *Perspect. Polit.* 1:103–11
- Demerath NJ III, Straight N. 1997. Lambs among the lions: America's culture wars in cross-cultural perspective. In *Cultural Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular Myth*, ed. RH Williams, pp. 199–220
- Demerath NJ III, Yang Y. 1997. What American culture war? See Williams 1997, pp. 17–38
- DiMaggio P. 2003. The myth of culture war: the disparity between private opinion and public policies. See Rieder 2003a, pp. 79–97
- DiMaggio P, Evans J, Bryson B. 1996. Have Americans' social attitudes become more polarized? *Am. J. Sociol.* 102:690–755
- DiMaggio P, Hargittai E, Celeste C, Shafer S. 2004. From unequal access to differentiated use: a literature review and agenda for research on digital inequality. In *Social Inequality*, ed K Neckerman, pp. 355–400. New York: Russell Sage Found.
- Dobrev SD. 2005. Career mobility and job flocking. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 34:800–20
- Domina T. 2006. Brain drain and brain gain: rising educational segregation in the United States, 1940–2000. *City Community* 5:387–407
- Doyle JM, Kao G. 2007. Friendship choices of multiracial adolescents: racial homophily, blending, or amalgamation? *Soc. Sci. Q.* 36:633–53
- Eliasoph N. 1998. *Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Ellwood DT, Jencks C. 2001. *The growing differences in family structure: what do we know? Where do we look for answers?* Work. Pap., John F. Kennedy Sch. Gov., Harvard Univ., July
- Evans JH. 1997. Worldviews or social groups as the source of moral value attitudes: implications for the culture wars thesis. *Sociol. Forum* 12:371–404
- Evans JH. 2003. Have Americans' attitudes become more polarized?—an update. *Soc. Sci. Q.* 84:71–90
- Evans JH, Bryson B, DiMaggio P. 2001. Opinion polarization: important contributions, necessary limitations. *Am. J. Sociol.* 106:944–59
- Featherstone M. 1991. *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage
- Fiorina M. 2004. *Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America*. New York: Pearson Longman
- Fiorina MP, Abrams SJ. 2008. Political polarization in the American public. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.* 11:563–88
- Fischer CS, Hout M. 2006. *Century of Difference: How America Changed in the Last One Hundred Years*. New York: Russell Sage Found.
- Fischer CS, Stockmayer G, Stiles J, Hout M. 2004. Distinguishing the geographic levels and social dimensions of U.S. metropolitan segregation, 1960–2000. *Demography* 41:37–59

- Florida R. 2002. *The Rise of the Creative Class*. New York: Basic Books
- Florida R. 2003. Cities and the creative class. *City Community* 2:3–19
- Florida R. 2008. *Who's Your City?: How the Creative Economy Is Making Where to Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life*. New York: Basic Books
- Franke-Ruta G. 2006. Remapping the culture debate. *Am. Prospect* 17:38–44
- Frey WH. 2001. *Melting Pot Suburbs: A Census 2000 Study of Suburban Diversity*. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst.
- Fong E, Chen W, Luk C. 2007. A comparison of ethnic businesses in suburbs and city. *City Community* 6:119–36
- Furstenberg FF. 2007. *Destinies of the Disadvantaged: The Politics of Teenage Childbearing*. New York: Russell Sage Found.
- Gamm GH. 1989. *The Making of New Deal Democrats: Voting Behavior and Realignment in Boston, 1920–1940*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Gans HJ. 1962. Urbanism and suburbanism as ways of life. In *Human Behavior and Social Processes*, ed. AM Rose, pp. 625–48. New York: Houghton-Mifflin
- García-Álvarez E, Katz-Gerro T, López-Sintas J. 2007. Deconstructing cultural omnivorousness 1982–2002: heterology in Americans' musical preferences. *Soc. Forces* 86:417–443
- Garreau J. 1989. *The Nine Nations of North America*. New York: Avon
- Gelman A, Park D, Shor B, Bafumi J, Cortina J. 2008. *Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
- Ghaziani A. 2008. *Dividends of Dissent: How Conflict and Culture Work in Lesbian and Gay Marches on Washington*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Giddens A. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press
- Gjerde J. 1997. *The Minds of the West: Ethno-Cultural Evolution in the Rural Middle West, 1830–1917*. Chapel Hill: Univ. N. C. Press
- Glaeser EL, Ward BA. 2008. Myths and realities of American political geography. *John F. Kennedy Sch. Gov. Res. Pap. No. RWP06-007*, Harvard Univ., Cambridge, MA. <http://ksnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-007>
- Goodsell TL, Williamson O. 2008. The case of the brick huggers: the practice of an online community. *City Community* 7:251–71
- Goss J. 1995. 'We know who you are and we know where you live': the instrumental rationality of geodemographic systems. *Econ. Geogr.* 71:171–98
- Gozdziaik EM, Martin SF, eds. 2005. *Beyond the Gateway: Immigrants in a Changing America*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books
- Graham OL. 2004. *Unguarded Gates: A History of America's Immigration Crisis*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
- Greeley A, Hout M. 2006. *The Truth about Conservative Christians*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Greene JP. 1988. *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture*. Chapel Hill: Univ. N. C. Press
- Gross RA. 1976. *The Minutemen and Their World*. New York: Hill & Wang
- Gullickson A. 2006a. Black/white interracial marriage trends, 1850–2000. *J. Fam. Hist.* 31:289–312
- Gullickson A. 2006b. Education and black-white interracial marriage. *Demography* 43:673–89
- Hampton K, Wellman B. 2003. Neighboring in Netville: how the Internet supports community and social capital in a wired suburb. *City Community* 2:277–311
- Han H, Brady DW. 2007. A delayed return to historical norms: congressional party polarization after the Second World War. *Brit. J. Polit. Sci.* 37:505–31
- Hanson FA. 2007. *The Trouble with Culture: How Computers Are Calming the Culture Wars*. Albany: SUNY Press
- Hargittai E, Hinnant A. 2008. Digital inequality: differences in young adults' use of the internet. *Commun. Res.* 35:602–21
- Harris DR, Ono H. 2005. How many interracial marriages would there be if all groups were of equal size in all places? A new look at national estimates of interracial marriage. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 34:236–51



- Hetherington MJ. 2001. Resurgent mass partisanship: the role of elite polarization. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 95:619–31
- Hirschman C. 1983. America's melting pot reconsidered. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 9:397–423
- Hoefler M, Rytina N, Campbell C. 2006. Estimates of the unauthorized immigrant population residing in the United States: January 2005. *Annu. Popul. Estim.*, Aug. Washington, DC: Off. Immigr. Stat. [http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILL\\_PE\\_2005.pdf](http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ILL_PE_2005.pdf)
- Hout M, Brooks C, Manza J. 1995. The democratic class struggle in the United States, 1948–1992. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 60:805–28
- Hull KE. 2006. *Same-Sex Marriage: The Cultural Politics of Love and Law*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press
- Hunter JD. 1991. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*. New York: Basic Books
- Hunter JD. 1994. *Before the Shooting Begins: Searching for Democracy in America's Culture Wars*. New York: Free Press
- Hunter JD, Bowman C. 1996. *The State of Disunion*. Ivy, VA: In Media Res. Educ. Found.
- Huntington SP. 2004. The Hispanic challenge. *Foreign Policy* 141:30–45
- Huntington SP. 2005. *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon & Schuster
- Iceland J, Wilkes R. 2006. Does socioeconomic status matter? Race, class, and residential segregation. *Soc. Probl.* 53:248–73
- Iyengar S, Morin R. 2006. Red media, blue media evidence for a political litmus test in online news readership. *Washington Post*, May 3
- Jackall R. 1989. *Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers*. Oxford Univ. Press
- Jelen TG. 1997. Culture wars and the party system: religion and realignment, 1972–1993. See Williams 1997, pp. 145–58
- Jencks C. 2001. Who should get in. Parts I and II. *N.Y. Rev. Books* 48(19 & 20). <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14868> and <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14942>
- Jiménez TR. 2008. Mexican immigrant replenishment and the continuing significance of ethnicity and race. *Am. J. Sociol.* 113:1527–67
- Johnston J, Baumann S. 2007. Democracy versus distinction: a study of omnivorousness in gourmet food writing. *Am. J. Sociol.* 113:165–207
- Jones RC. 2008. *Immigrants Outside Megalopolis*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books
- Joyner K, Kao G. 2000. School racial composition and adolescent racial homophily. *Soc. Sci. Q.* 81:810–25
- Kalmijn M. 1998. Inter-marriage and homogamy: causes, patterns, trends. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 24:395–421
- Katz-Gerro T. 2002. Highbrow cultural consumption and class distinction in Italy, Israel, West Germany, Sweden, and the United States. *Soc. Forces* 81:207–29
- Katz-Gerro T. 2004. Cultural consumption research: review of methodology, theory, and consequence. *Int. Rev. Sociol.* 14:11–29
- Kennedy TLM, Smith A, Wells AT, Wellman B. 2008. *Networked Families*. Washington, DC: Pew Internet Am. Life Proj. Rep.
- Kesler C, Bloemraad I. 2008. *Do immigrants hurt civic and political engagement? The conditional effects of immigrant diversity on trust, membership and participation across 23 countries, 1981-2001*. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Sociol. Assoc., 103rd, Boston
- King BG, Bentele KG, Soule SA. 2007. Protest and policymaking: explaining fluctuation in congressional attention to rights issues, 1960–1986. *Soc. Forces* 86:137–163
- Kmec JA. 2007. Ties that bind? Race and networks in job turnover. *Soc. Probl.* 54:483–503
- Krysan M, Bader M. 2007. Perceiving the metropolis: seeing the city through a prism of race. *Soc. Forces* 86:699–733
- Kunda G. 2006. *Engineering Culture: Control and Commitment in a High-Tech Corporation*. Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press
- Lane RE. 1965. The politics of consensus in an age of affluence. *Am. Polit. Sci. Rev.* 59:874–95
- Lareau A. 2003. *Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Layman GC, Carsey TM. 2002. Party polarization and 'conflict extension' in the American electorate. *Am. J. Polit. Sci.* 46:786–803

- Lee J, Bean FD. 2004. America's changing color lines: immigration, race/ethnicity, and multiracial identification. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 30:221–42
- Lee SM, Fernandez M. 1998. Trends in Asian American racial/ethnic intermarriage: a comparison of 1980 and 1990 census data. *Soc. Perspect.* 41:323–42
- Lesthaeghe RJ, Neidert L. 2006. The second demographic transition in the United States: Exception or textbook example? *Popul. Dev. Rev.* 32:669–98
- Lichter DT, Brown JB, Qian Z, Carmalt JH. 2007. Marital assimilation among Hispanics: evidence of declining cultural and economic incorporation. *Soc. Sci. Q.* 88:745–65
- Lieberson S. 1980. *A Piece of the Pie: Blacks and White Immigrants Since 1880*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Livingstone S. 2008. Taking risky opportunities in youthful content creation: teenagers' use of social networking sites for intimacy, privacy and self-expression. *New Media Soc.* 10:393–411
- Lizardo O. 2006a. How cultural tastes shape personal networks. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 71:778–807
- Lizardo O. 2006b. The puzzle of women's "highbrow" culture consumption: integrating gender and work into Bourdieu's class theory of taste. *Poetics* 34:1–23
- Lloyd R. 2006. *Neo-Bohemia: Art and Commerce in the Postindustrial City*. New York: Routledge
- Lobao L, Meyer K. 2001. The great agricultural transition: crisis, change, and social consequences of twentieth century US farming. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 27:103–24
- Lockridge KP. 1985. *A New England Town: The First Hundred Years*. New York: Norton. Expanded Ed.
- Logan JR, Alba RD, Zhang W. 2002. Immigrant enclaves and ethnic communities in New York and Los Angeles. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 67:299–332
- Logan JR, Stults BJ, Farley R. 2004. Segregation of minorities in the metropolis: two decades of change. *Demography* 41:1–22
- López-Sintas J, Katz-Gerro T. 2005. From exclusive to inclusive elitists and further: twenty years of omnivorousness and cultural diversity in arts participation in the USA. *Poetics* 33:299–319
- Luker K. 1985. *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Luker K. 2007. *When Sex Goes to School: Warring Views on Sex—and Sex Education—Since the Sixties*. New York: Norton
- Luloff AE, Krannich RS, eds. 2002. *Persistence and Change in Rural Communities: A 50-Year Follow-Up to Six Classic Studies*. Wallingford, UK: CABI
- Mahler SJ. 1995. *American Dreaming: Immigrant Life in the Margins*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press
- Manza J, Brooks C. 1997. The religious factor in U.S. presidential elections, 1960–1992. *Am. J. Sociol.* 103:38–81
- Mark N. 2003. Culture and competition: homophily and distancing explanations for cultural niches. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 68:319–45
- Martin SP. 2006. Trends in marital dissolution by women's education in the United States. *Demogr. Res.* 15:537–60. <http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol15/20>
- McCarty N, Poole KT, Rosenthal H. 2006. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
- McConkey D. 2001. Whither Hunter's culture war? Shifts in evangelical morality, 1988–1998. *Sociol. Relig.* 62:149–74
- McPherson M, Smith-Lovin L, Cook JM. 2001. Birds of a feather: homophily in social networks. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 27:415–44
- Melican DB, Dixon TL. 2008. News on the net: credibility, selective exposure, and racial prejudice. *Commun. Res.* 35:151–68
- Michman RD, Mazze EM, Greco AJ. 2003. *Lifestyle Marketing: Reaching the New American Consumer*. Westport, CT: Praeger
- Miller AS, Hoffmann JP. 1999. The growing divisiveness: culture wars or a war of words? *Soc. Forces* 78:721–45
- Modarres A. 2004. Neighborhood integration: temporality and social fracture. *J. Urban Aff.* 26:351–77
- Montgomery AF. 2006. 'Living in each other's pockets': the navigation of social distances by middle class families in Los Angeles. *City Community* 5:425–50
- Morawska E. 1994. In defense of the assimilation model. *J. Am. Ethn. Hist.* 13:75–87
- Morris JS. 2007. Slanted objectivity? Perceived media bias, cable news exposure, and political attitudes. *Soc. Sci. Q.* 88:707–28

- Murphy AK. 2007. The suburban ghetto: the legacy of Herbert Gans in understanding the experience of poverty in recently impoverished American suburbs. *City Community* 6:21–37
- Nivola PS, Brady DW, eds. 2006. *Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America's Polarized Politics*. Vol. 1. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. Press
- Nivola PS, Brady DW, eds. 2008. *Red and Blue Nation? Consequences and Correction of America's Polarized Politics*. Vol. 2. Washington, DC: Brookings Inst. Press
- Ono H, Zavodny M. 2008. Immigrants, English ability and the digital divide. *Soc. Forces* 86:1455–79
- Papademetriou D. 2004. The foreign-born from Mexico in the United States: 1960 to 2000. In *The Hispanic Challenge? What We Know About Latino Immigration*, ed. PS Strum, A Selee, pp. 3–7. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Int. Cent. Sch.
- Park RE. 1915. The city: suggestions for the investigation of human behavior in the city environment. *Am. J. Sociol.* 20:577–612
- Parrado EA, Morgan SP. 2008. Intergenerational fertility among Hispanic women: new evidence of immigrant assimilation. *Demography* 45:651–71
- Passel JS. 2006. The size and characteristics of the unauthorized migrant population in the U.S. Estimates based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey. *Res. Rep. Pew Hisp. Cent.*, Washington, DC, Mar. 7
- Perlmann J. 2007. *Italians Then, Mexicans Now: Immigrant Origins and Second-Generation Progress, 1890 to 2000*. New York: Russell Sage Found.
- Perlmann J, Waldinger R. 1997. Second generation decline? Children of immigrants, past and present—a reconsideration. *Int. Migr. Rev.* 31:893–922
- Peterson RA. 2005. Problems in comparative research: the example of omnivorousness. *Poetics* 33:257–282
- Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2003. *Evenly Divided and Increasingly Polarized: 2004 Political Landscape*. Washington, DC: Pew Res. Cent. <http://people-press.org/report/196/the-2004-political-landscape>
- Phelan TJ, Schneider M. 1996. Race, ethnicity, and class in American suburbs. *Urban Aff. Rev.* 31:659–80
- Portes A. 2007. Migration, development, and segmented assimilation: a conceptual review of the evidence. *Ann. Am. Acad. Polit. Soc. Sci.* 610:73–97
- Powell WW, Snellman K. 2004. The knowledge economy. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 30:199–220
- Putnam RD. 2001. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster
- Putnam RD. 2007. E pluribus unum: diversity and community in the twenty-first century. *Scand. Polit. Stud.* 30:138–75
- Qian Z, Lichter DT. 2007. Social boundaries and marital assimilation: interpreting trends in racial and ethnic intermarriage. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 72:68–94
- Rieder J, ed. 2003a. *The Fractious Nation: Unity and Division in Contemporary American Life*. Berkeley: Univ. Calif. Press
- Rieder J. 2003b. Getting a fix on fragmentation. See Rieder 2003a, pp. 13–54
- Riis JA. 1890. *How the Other Half Lives*. New York: Scribner's
- Rodino-Colocino M. 2006. Laboring under the digital divide. *New Media Soc.* 8:487–511
- Rohlinger DA. 2006. Friends and foes: media, politics, and tactics in the abortion war. *Soc. Forces* 53:537–61
- Rosenfeld MJ. 2002. Measures of assimilation in the marriage market: Mexican Americans 1970–1990. *J. Marriage Fam.* 64:152–62
- Roth LM. 2004a. Bringing clients back in: homophily preferences and inequality on Wall Street. *Sociol. Q.* 45:613–35
- Roth LM. 2004b. The social psychology of tokenism: status and homophily processes on Wall Street. *Soc. Perspect.* 47:189–214
- Ruef M, Aldrich HE, Carter NM. 2003. The structure of founding teams: homophily, strong ties, and isolation among U.S. entrepreneurs. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 68:195–222
- Rumbaut RG. 1994. The crucible within: ethnic identity, self-esteem, and segmented assimilation among children of immigrants. *Int. Migr. Rev.* 28:748–95
- Rumbaut RG, Massey DS, Bean FD. 2006. Linguistic life expectancies: immigrant language retention in southern California. *Popul. Dev. Rev.* 32:447–60
- Saad L. 2008. Americans evenly divided on morality of homosexuality. *Gallup Poll*, July 18. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/108115/Americans-Evenly-Divided-Morality-Homosexuality.aspx>

- Schmitt KM, Gunther AC, Liebhard JL. 2004. Why partisans see mass media as biased. *Commun. Res.* 31:623–41
- Schwartz CR, Mare RD. 2005. Trends in educational assortative marriage from 1940 to 2003. *Demography* 42:621–46
- Shah DV, Cho J, Eveland WP Jr, Kwak N. 2005. Information and expression in a digital age. *Commun. Res.* 32:531–65
- Siegel P, Martin E, Bruno R. 2000. *Language use and linguistic isolation: historical data and methodological issues*. Presented at FCSM Statistical Policy Semin., Bethesda, MD Nov. 8–9. <http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/lang-use.html>
- Singer A, Hardwick SW, Brettell CB, eds. 2008. *Twenty-First-Century Gateways: Immigrant Incorporation in Suburban America*. Washington, DC: Brookings
- Smith C. 1997. The myth of culture wars: the case of American Protestantism. See Williams 1997, pp. 175–98
- Smith C. 1998. *American Evangelicalism: Embattled and Thriving*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Sohoni D. 2006. *Assimilation during periods of high immigration: intermarriage on the West Coast of the United States*. Presented at Annu. Meet. Am. Sociol. Assoc., 101<sup>st</sup>, Montreal
- South SJ, Crowder K, Chavez E. 2005. Migration and spatial assimilation among U.S. Latinos: classical versus segmented trajectories. *Demography* 42:497–521
- Stein A. 2001. *The Stranger Next Door: The Story of a Small Community's Battle Over Sex, Faith, and Civil Rights*. Boston: Beacon
- Stern MJ, Dillman DA. 2006. Community participation, social ties, and use of the Internet. *City Community* 5:409–24
- Stolle D, Soroka S, Johnston R. 2008. When does diversity erode trust? Neighborhood diversity, interpersonal trust and the mediating effect of social interactions. *Polit. Stud.* 56:57–75
- Stonecash JM, Brewer MD, Mariani MD. 2003. *Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment and Party Polarization*. Boulder, CO: Westview
- Stroud NJ. 2008. Media use and political predispositions: revisiting the concept of selective exposure. *Polit. Behav.* 30:341–66
- Suarez-Orozco M, Suarez-Orozco C. 2007. Moving stories: immigrant youth adapt to change. *DuBois Rev.* 4:351–59
- Swidler A. 1986. Culture in action: symbols and strategies. *Am. Sociol. Rev.* 51:273–86
- Tampubolon G. 2008. Revisiting omnivores in America circa 1990s: the exclusiveness of omnivores? *Poetics* 36:243–64
- Tewksbury D. 2005. The seeds of audience fragmentation: specialization in the use of online news sites. *J. Broadcast. Electron. Media* 49:332–48
- Tharp MC. 2001. *Marketing and Consumer Identity in Multicultural America*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Timberlake JM, Iceland J. 2007. Change in racial and ethnic residential inequality in American cities, 1970–2000. *City Community* 6:335–66
- Tomlinson M. 2003. Lifestyle and social class. *Eur. Sociol. Rev.* 19(1):97–111
- Toussaint-Comeau M. 2006. The occupational assimilation of Hispanic immigrants in the U.S.: evidence from panel data. *Int. Migr. Rev.* 40:508–36
- Turow J. 2008. *Niche Envy: Marketing Discrimination in the Digital Age*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
- U.S. Census Bur. 2000. *Foreign-Born Profiles (STP-159)*. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bur. <http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/foreign/STP-159-2000tl.html>
- U.S. Census Bur. 2005. *Table 1A. Presence of a Computer and the Internet for Households, by Selected Characteristics: October 2003*. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bur. <http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/computer/2003/tab01A.xls>
- U.S. Census Bur. 2008a. *Historical Income Inequality Tables*. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bur. <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/ineqtoc.html>
- U.S. Census Bur. 2008b. *Statistical Abstract of the United States 2008*. Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bur. <http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab>
- Vaccari C. 2008. From the air to the ground: the Internet in the 2004 US presidential campaign. *New Media Soc.* 10:647–65

- Valkenburg PM, Peter J. 2008. Adolescents' identity experiments on the Internet. *Commun. Res.* 35:208–31
- van Eijck K, Lievens J. 2008. Cultural omnivorousness as a combination of highbrow, pop, and folk elements: the relation between taste patterns and attitudes concerning social integration. *Poetics* 36:217–42
- Vaughan D. 1997. *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Vesselinov E, Cazessus M, Falk W. 2007. Gated communities and spatial inequality. *J. Urban Aff.* 29:109–27
- Wahl AMG, Breckenridge RS, Gunkel SE. 2006. Latinos, residential segregation and spatial assimilation in micropolitan areas: exploring the American dilemma on a new frontier. *Soc. Sci. Res.* 36:995–1020
- Waldinger R, Lim N, et al. 2007. Bad jobs, good jobs, no jobs? The employment experience of the Mexican American second generation. *J. Ethn. Migr. Stud.* 33:1–35
- Waldman S, Green JC. 2006. Tribal relations: how Americans really sort out on cultural and religious issues—and what it means for our politics. *Atlantic Mon.* 297:136–42
- Warde A, Wright D, Gayo-Cal M. 2007. Understanding cultural omnivorousness: or, the myth of the cultural omnivore. *Cult. Soc.* 1:143–64
- Weiss MJ. 2000. *The Clustered World: How We Live, What We Buy, and What It All Means About Who We Are*. Boston: Little, Brown
- Wildsmith E, Gutmann MP, Gratton B. 2003. Assimilation and intermarriage for U.S. immigrant groups, 1880–1990. *Hist. Fam.* 8:563–84
- Williams RH, ed. 1997. *Cultural Wars in American Politics: Critical Reviews of a Popular Myth*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter
- Wilson WJ. 1980. *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions*. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press
- Winseman A. 2004. Public thinks Americans divided. *Gallup Poll*. <http://www.gallup.com>
- Wolfe A. 1998. *One Nation, After All: How Middle-Class Americans Really Think about God, Country, Family, Racism, Welfare, Immigration, Homosexuality, Work, the Right, the Left, and Each Other*. New York: Viking
- Wolff EN. 2000. *Recent trends in wealth ownership, 1983–1998*. Work. Pap. No. 300, Jerome Levy Inst., Bard College, New York
- Zhou M, Xiong YS. 2005. The multifaceted American experiences of the children of Asian immigrants: lessons for segmented assimilation. *Ethn. Racial Stud.* 28:1119–52
- Zukin S, Maguire JS. 2004. Consumers and consumption. *Annu. Rev. Sociol.* 30:173–97



# Contents

Frontispiece <i>Herbert J. Gans</i> .....	xiv
<b>Prefatory Chapters</b>	
Working in Six Research Areas: A Multi-Field Sociological Career <i>Herbert J. Gans</i> .....	1
<b>Theory and Methods</b>	
Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism <i>Rogers Brubaker</i> .....	21
Interdisciplinarity: A Critical Assessment <i>Jerry A. Jacobs and Scott Frickel</i> .....	43
Nonparametric Methods for Modeling Nonlinearity in Regression Analysis <i>Robert Andersen</i> .....	67
Gender Ideology: Components, Predictors, and Consequences <i>Shannon N. Davis and Theodore N. Greenstein</i> .....	87
Genetics and Social Inquiry <i>Jeremy Freese and Sara Shostak</i> .....	107
<b>Social Processes</b>	
Race Mixture: Boundary Crossing in Comparative Perspective <i>Edward E. Telles and Christina A. Sue</i> .....	129
The Sociology of Emotional Labor <i>Amy S. Wharton</i> .....	147
Societal Responses to Terrorist Attacks <i>Seymour Spilerman and Guy Stecklov</i> .....	167
Intergenerational Family Relations in Adulthood: Patterns, Variations, and Implications in the Contemporary United States <i>Teresa Toguchi Swartz</i> .....	191

## **Institutions and Culture**

Sociology of Sex Work <i>Ronald Weitzer</i> .....	213
The Sociology of War and the Military <i>Meyer Kestnbaum</i> .....	235
Socioeconomic Attainments of Asian Americans <i>Arthur Sakamoto, Kimberly A. Goyette, and ChangHwan Kim</i> .....	255
Men, Masculinity, and Manhood Acts <i>Douglas Schrock and Michael Schwalbe</i> .....	277

## **Formal Organizations**

American Trade Unions and Data Limitations: A New Agenda for Labor Studies <i>Caleb Southworth and Judith Stepan-Norris</i> .....	297
Outsourcing and the Changing Nature of Work <i>Alison Davis-Blake and Joseph P. Broschak</i> .....	321
Taming Prometheus: Talk About Safety and Culture <i>Susan S. Silbey</i> .....	341

## **Political and Economic Sociology**

Paradoxes of China's Economic Boom <i>Martin King Whyte</i> .....	371
Political Sociology and Social Movements <i>Andrew G. Walder</i> .....	393

## **Differentiation and Stratification**

New Directions in Life Course Research <i>Karl Ulrich Mayer</i> .....	413
Is America Fragmenting? <i>Claude S. Fischer and Greggor Mattson</i> .....	435
Switching Social Contexts: The Effects of Housing Mobility and School Choice Programs on Youth Outcomes <i>Stefanie DeLuca and Elizabeth Dayton</i> .....	457
Income Inequality and Social Dysfunction <i>Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate E. Pickett</i> .....	493
Educational Assortative Marriage in Comparative Perspective <i>Hans-Peter Blossfeld</i> .....	513

## Individual and Society

Nonhumans in Social Interaction <i>Karen A. Cerulo</i> .....	531
---	-----

## Demography

Social Class Differentials in Health and Mortality: Patterns and Explanations in Comparative Perspective <i>Irma T. Elo</i> .....	553
---	-----

## Policy

The Impacts of Wal-Mart: The Rise and Consequences of the World's Dominant Retailer <i>Gary Gereffi and Michelle Christian</i> .....	573
--	-----

## Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 26–35 .....	593
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 26–35 .....	597

## Errata

An online log of corrections to *Annual Review of Sociology* articles may be found at  
<http://soc.annualreviews.org/errata.shtml>